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Abstract As an emerging patient-centric model of health information ex-
change, personal health record (PHR) is often outsourced to be stored at a
third party. The value of PHR data is its long-term cumulative record relevant
with personal health which can be significant in the future when faced with
disease occurrences. As a promising public key primitive, attribute-based en-
cryption (ABE) has been used to design PHR sharing systems. However, the
existing solutions fail to achieve several important security objectives, that
is, no need for a single authority to issue private keys to all PHR users, user
access privacy protection, and user accountability. In this paper, we propose
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2 Fatos Xhafa et al.
a multi-authority ciphertext-policy ABE scheme with user accountability and
apply it to design an attribute-based PHR sharing system. In the proposed
solution, the access policy is hidden and hence user access privacy is protected.
In particular, the global identity of a misbehaving PHR user who leaked the
decryption key to other unauthorized users can be traced, and thus the trust
assumptions on both the authorities and the PHR users are reduced. Extensive
analysis shows that the proposed scheme is provably secure and efficient.
Keywords Personal health record · Cloud computing · Multi-authority ·
Anonymity · Accountability
1 Introduction
In recent times, there has been a remarkable upsurge in activity surrounding
the utilization of personal health record (PHR) systems for individuals such
as patients and consumers. The value of PHR data is its long-term cumulative
record relevant with personal health which can be significant in the future when
faced with disease occurrences. According to the definition in [1], the PHR is
an electronic application through which people can access and coordinate their
health information and share parts of it with those who need it in a private
and secure environment. In part, PHR systems can be seen as a repository for
patient health data. Besides providing the fundamental repository service to
individuals to store their PHR data, PHR systems also include other desir-
able functionality such as the functionality of decision support. They can help
patients make the best decision to improve their health care quality.
With the advent of cloud computing, healthcare service providers have
moved their PHR data to public clouds. Google and Microsoft are two primary
cloud service providers, and they can offer PHR services based on their cloud
platforms. To eliminate the risk of privacy exposure, PHR service providers
should not only encrypt patients’ data, but also allow PHR owners to control
with whom they intend to share PHR data. That is, PHR systems should
realize patient-centric model of health information exchange. To assure the
patients’ full control over their own PHR data, there has been an increasing
interest in applying attribute-based encryption (ABE) to realize secure PHR
sharing. Ibraimi et al. [2] applied ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) [3] to
manage the sharing of PHR data. Akinyele et al. [4] adopted ABE to gener-
ate self-protecting electronic healthcare records (EMRs), which can either be
stored on cell phones so that EMR could be accessed even if the health provider
is oﬄine. However, the above solutions usually use a single attribute authority
(AA), which is trusted by all users in the system. In addition, it is not practical
to delegate all attribute management tasks to one AA, including certifying all
users’ attributes and generating attribute private keys. Recently, Li et al. [12,
5] proposed a novel patient-centric framework and a suite of mechanisms for
data access control to PHR data stored in semi-trusted cloud servers. Similar
to the technique in [2], the PHR users in the sharing system in [5] are divided
into multiple security domains, which greatly reduces the complexity of key
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management for PHR owners and PHR users. To guarantee patient privacy,
multi-authority ABE [6] are exploited in [5,13]. Lu et al. [7] proposed a secure
and privacy-preserving opportunistic computing framework for mobile health-
care emergency. There are also many other healthcare-related solutions [8,9,
10] proposed to realize secure PHR data sharing.
Although the above schemes apply ABE to design PHR sharing systems,
there is an important security aspect, user accountability, has not be formally
addressed. This problem is extremely important in that attribute private keys
directly imply PHR users’ privileges to the protected data in the attribute-
based setting. The dishonest PHR users may share their attribute private keys
with unauthorized users. They can just directly give part of their original or
transformed private keys such that nobody can tell who has disclosed these
keys. This will violate the privacy protection of patients. To our knowledge, the
issue of user accountability in PHR sharing systems based on multi-authority
ABE is quite new and has not been solved yet.
Our Contribution. In order to realize user accountability in PHR sharing
systems, in this paper, we propose a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme with
user accountability. The supported policy is AND gates on multiple attribute
values and wildcards. In our scheme, a PHR user obtains his attribute private
key and if the attribute set associated with the private key does not satisfy the
access policy in a PHR ciphertext, the PHR user cannot decrypt and guess
what access policy was specified by the PHR owner. Hence, the access policy
is hidden and user access privacy is protected. We apply the proposed scheme
to design an attribute-based PHR sharing system, which allows to trace the
global identity of a misbehaving PHR user who leaked the decryption key to
others, and thus reduces the trust assumptions not only on the authorities
but also the PHR users. Extensive analysis shows that the proposed scheme
is secure and efficient.
1.1 Related Work
Since the introduction of ABE in implementing fine-grained access control
systems [11], a lot of works have been proposed to design flexible ABE schemes.
ABE comes in two flavors called key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and CP-ABE [14].
The first KP-ABE construction [14] realized the monotonic access policy for
key policies. Bethencourt et al. proposed the first CP-ABE construction [3].
To further achieve users’ attribute privacy protection, anonymous ABE
[15] has received a lot of attention. For practicality, a more efficient anony-
mous CP-ABE scheme was constructed [16]. In particular, Zhang et al. [17]
introduced a novel technique called match-then-decrypt into the decryption
of anonymous ABE, which can greatly improve the decryption efficiency of
anonymous ABE. Although anonymous ABE can realize secure anonymous
PHR sharing, before its widely deployment, another important security issue,
user accountability, has to be addressed. Several attempts [18,19,20] have been
made to address the accountability problem in attribute-based access control.
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In [18], they considered how to defend the key-abuse problem in KP-ABE.
In addition to the user accountability, the user attribute privacy is also taken
into consideration in [19]. However, these schemes may not be entirely realis-
tic, in that they assume the existence of a single trusted party who monitors
all attributes and generates all decryption keys. In order to reduce the trust
assumption, Li et al. [21] proposed a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme with
user accountability, where each attribute has two values. To our knowledge,
there are no multi-authority attribute-based PHR sharing systems, which si-
multaneously support users’ attribute privacy protection and accountability.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
Let [N ] = {1, 2, · · · , N} and U be the universal attribute set of the PHR shar-
ing system. We denote by Uk the attribute set managed by the k-th attribute
authority AAk. Let ωk,i ∈ Sk,i be the i-th attribute distributed by AAk.
2.2 Bilinear Pairings
Let G and GT be cyclic multiplicative groups of some large prime order p and
we denote the identity of GT as 1. We call eˆ a bilinear pairing if eˆ : G×G→ GT
is a map with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈R Zp.
2. Non-degenerate: There exists g1, g2 ∈ G such that eˆ(g1, g2) 6= 1.
3. Computable: It is feasible to compute eˆ(g1, g2) for all g1, g2 ∈R G.
2.3 Access Structure
As a generalization of access structures in [22], the adopted access structures
are the same as those in [16,19]. L satisfies W is represented as L |= W , and
the case of L does not satisfy W is denoted by L 6|= W . Formally, given an
attribute list L = [L1, L2, · · · , Ln] and an access structure W = [W1,W2, · · · ,
Wn], L |= W if Li = Wi or Wi = ∗ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and otherwise L 6|= W .
It is noted that the wildcard ∗ in W plays the role of “don’t care” value.
3 System Model and Design Goals
3.1 System Architecture
As shown in Fig. 1, the architecture of the accountable attribute-based PHR
sharing system in cloud storage consists of five entities. We only describe
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PHR Service Provider
PHR Owners PHR Users
Third Party Auditor
ManageManage
Cloud Storage
Servers
Data Service
Manager
AA1 AA2 AAN
N Attribute Authorities
PHR Data Access
Trace
Fig. 1 Architecture of attribute-based PHR sharing system in cloud
the third party auditor (TPA). The other enties are the same as those in
typical ABE system. The TPA is a third parity auditor, who can trace the
identity of dishonest users. These dishonest users may share their attribute
private keys with other users, who do not have these privileges. In our system,
user accountability can be achieved in the black-box model by embedding
additional user-specific information into the attribute private key, while still
hiding access policies.
3.2 Security Goals
To realize “patient-centric” PHR sharing, a core requirement is that each
patient can easily control who can access his own PHR data. The potential
threats of the system and our security goals are summarized as follows:
– Confidentiality. By confidentiality we mean that unauthorized PHR users
(may be the PHR service provider and adversaries) who do not have enough
attributes matching the access policy specified for a ciphertext by a PHR
owner should be prevented from accessing the PHR data.
– Collusion-Resistance. Even if multiple PHR users collude, they cannot
access the plaintext of a PHR ciphertext if each user cannot decrypt the
ciphertext alone.
– Key-Escrow Freeness. In most of the existing PHR sharing systems, a
central attribute authority is introduced, which requires too much trust on
a single authority. Furthermore, a single authority may be a performance
bottleneck of the system when there are a large number of PHR users.
– Attribute Privacy Protection. In PHR sharing systems, the access pol-
icy itself could be sensitive information and needs to be protected.
– Accountability. In attribute-based PHR sharing systems, the attribute
private key directly imply users’ privileges to the protected PHR data. The
problem of key abuse is important and should be prevented.
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3.3 Definition of Multi-Authority CP-ABE with Accountability
A N -authority CP-ABE scheme with accountability consists of the following
five algorithms:
– Setup(1λ, N) → (params, {(APKk, ASKk)}k∈[N ]): The randomized setup
algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and the total num-
ber of attribute authorities N ∈ N, and outputs the system parameters
params, N public/private key pairs {(APKk, ASKk)}k∈[N ] for the N at-
tribute authorities, respectively. We assume that the other algorithms take
params and {(APKk)}k∈[N ] as implicit inputs. Also, the attribute domains
managed by each attribute authority is included in params.
– AttKeyGen(ASKk, Lk,GID)→ SKk,Lk,ID: The randomized key generation
algorithm is run by the k-th attribute authority AAk. On input the its pri-
vate key ASKk, an attribute list Lk = {Lk,1, Lk,2, · · · , Lk,nk} and a global
identity GID, it outputs SKk,Lk,ID as a decryption key corresponding to
the attribute list Lk for the PHR user with the global identity GID.
– Encrypt(M,W ) → CTW : The randomized encryption algorithm is run
by the encryptor. On input a message M and a ciphertext policy W =
[W1,W2, · · · ,WN ], it generates a ciphertext CTW as the encryption of M
with respect to W , where Wk reflects a subset of the attribute domain
managed by the k-th attribute authority.
– Decrypt(CTW , SKL,ID) → M or ⊥: The decryption is run by the PHR
users. On input a ciphertext CTW of a message M under a ciphertext
policy W , and a secret key SKL,ID = {SKk,Lk,ID}k∈[N ] associated with
L and GID, the ciphertext CTW is successfully decrypted to recover the
message M if (L ‖ GID) |= W . Otherwise, the algorithm returns ⊥.
– TraceD(W ): This is an oracle algorithm for recovering the global identity
GID related to the decryption private key incorporated in a private device
D. It takes as inputs the public parameters and the ciphertext policy W ,
and outputs a global identity.
4 Privacy-Aware Attribute-Based PHR Sharing System with User
Accountability
4.1 Overview of the Proposed Solution
In our solution, a PHR user is given an attribute private key associated
with L ‖ GID, where L represents an attribute list and GID is the PHR
user’s global identity. In order to realize attribute privacy protection, for
each attribute value vk,i,t, we compute four ciphertext components Ck,i,t,0,
Ck,i,t,1,Ĉk,i,t,0,Ĉk,i,t,1. Based on the components specified by indexes of the
attribute secret key, a recipient can decrypt a ciphertext without knowing
the potential ciphertext policy. To make it hard to distinguish the well-formed
ciphertext component from the malformed one, we use the linear splitting tech-
nique [23]. The ciphertext is computed by splitting the random value s into two
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parts sk,i,t and s−sk,i,t. To achieve user accountability, in normal encryption,
a PHR data is encrypted under a ciphertext policy W = W ′ ‖ ∗ such that any
PHR user with L ‖ GID satisfying (L ‖ GID) |= W is able to decrypt, regard-
less of the user’s identity. Obviously, this holds because the second part in the
W is “don’t care”. In the tracing algorithm, a PHR data is encrypted with
W = W ′ ‖ GID∗ to test whether the identity in the private device is GID. It
follows from the anonymity that the ciphertext is indistinguishable from other
ciphertexts under the ciphertext policy W ′ ‖ ∗. And, only users with attribute
private key associated with L ‖ GID satisfying (L ‖ GID) |= W can decrypt
the ciphertext. As a result, the global identity GID∗ can be determined in the
private device. Finally, in order to eliminate central authorities, we use a set
of pseudorandom functions.
4.2 Description of the Proposed PHR Sharing System
– System Initialization: Assume that the universe of attributes in the
PHR sharing system is denoted by U = {ωk,i}k∈[N ],i∈nk . Then, based on a
security parameter 1λ and the following system setup algorithm Setup, the
public system parameter params and N public/private key pairs for the N
attribute authorities are generated, respectively.
Setup: Let G, GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p,
and eˆ : G×G → GT be a bilinear pairing. Let g1, g2 be random elements
from G. Define two hash functions H0 : {0, 1}ρ → G and H : {0, 1}∗ → G.
Let AA1,AA2, · · · ,AAN ,AAN+1 be the N + 1 attribute authorities in the
system. Each authority AAk is in charge of a disjoint set of nk attributes.
Let the value set of the i-th attribute managed by authority AAk be Sk =
{ωk,i|1 ≤ i ≤ nk}, and Sk,i = {vk,i,t|1 ≤ t ≤ mk,i} be the value set of the
attribute ωk,i, where nk,mk,i ∈ N. Also, the set of attributes managed by
authority AAN+1 is the set of users’ global identities, i.e., ωN+1,i ∈ {0, 1}
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ nN+1 = ρ, the bit-length of an identity with 2ρ < p. Then,
the following steps are fulfilled:
1. For 1 ≤ k ≤ N + 1, the attribute authority AAk chooses xk ∈R Z∗p as
his secret key, computes yk = g
xk
1 and sends eˆ(g1, g2)
xk to the other
attribute authorities.
2. Every attribute authority can compute a system public key Y as
Y = eˆ(
∑N+1
k=1
yk, g2) =
∑N+1
k=1
eˆ(g1, g2)
xk .
Finally, the system public parameters are params = (g1, g2, Y,H0, H).
– PHR User Grant: Assuming a new PHR user with global identity GID is
intended to join the PHR sharing system, he needs to request an attribute
private key associated with his attribute list L from the attribute authori-
ties. Specifically, the attribute authorities run the following key generation
algorithm AttKeyGen to generate the private key for the PHR user.
AttKeyGen: The attribute private key is generated in the following:
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1. Each attribute authority AAk shares a secret pseudorandom function
(PRF) seed sk,k′ ∈ Z∗p with AAk′ . It also chooses a PRF seed ak ∈
Z∗p and computes y′k = g
ak
1 , which is sent to all the other attribute
authorities. It then defines a pseudorandom function PRFk,k′(GID) =
g
aka
′
k
s
k,k′+X
1 , where X = H0(GID).
2. To generate an attribute private key for the attribute list L = L1 ‖
L2 ‖ · · · ‖ LN , the user with global identity GID = (I1, I2, · · · , Iρ) ∈
{0, 1}ρ first gets {Dk,j} for k 6= j by using the anonymous key-issuing
protocol with the k-th authority. In more details, the user starts N
indpendent invocations of the anonymous key-issuing protocol on input
(yakj , g1, δk,jRk,j , sk,j , δk,j) with the k-th authority, where Rk,j ∈R Z∗p
is randomly chosen by the authority AAk, and δk,j is 1 if k > j and -1
otherwise, for j ∈ [N + 1] − {k}. At the end, the user obtains Ek,j =
g
Rk,j
1 PRFk,j(GID) if k > j, and Ek,j =
g
Rk,j
1
PRFk,j(GID)
otherwise.
3. Note that, the PRF values for the same global identity GID from mul-
tiple authorities cancel each other. After interacted with all N + 1
authorities, it follows that E =
∏
k,k′∈[N+1],k 6=k′ Ek,k′ = g
R
1 where
R =
∑
k,k′∈[N+1],k 6=k′ Rk,k′ .
4. In order to generate an attribute private key for an attribute list Lk =
{Lk,1, Lk,2, · · · , Lk,nk} = {vk,1,tk,1 , vk,2,tk,2 , · · · , vk,nk,tk,nk } ⊆ Sk from
the k-th attribute authority, AAk picks up rk,1, rk,2, · · · , rk,nk−1, λk,1,
λk,2, · · · , λk,nk , λ̂k,1, λ̂k,2, · · · , λ̂k,nk ∈R Z∗p and also computes rk,nk =
xk −
∑nk−1
i=1 rk,i −
∑
k′∈[N+1]−k Rk,k′ . Then, the private key compo-
nent is computed as SKk,Lk,ID = {Dk,i,0, Dk,i,1, D̂k,i,0, D̂k,i,1}i∈[nk] =
{gλk,i2 , grk,i1 H(0||k||i||vk,i,tk,i)λk,i , gλ̂k,i1 , grk,i2 H(1||k||i||vk,i,tk,i)λ̂k,i}i∈[nk].
5. AAN+1 chooses {ri ∈ Z∗p}i∈[ρ−1], {λi, λ̂i ∈ Z∗p}i∈[ρ] and computes rρ =
xN+1−
∑ρ−1
i=1 ri−
∑
k′∈[N ]RN+1,k′ . Then SKID = {Dj,0, Dj,1, D̂j,0, D̂j,1
}j∈[ρ] = {gλj2 , grj1 H(0||N + 1||j||Ij)λj , gλ̂j1 , grj2 H(1||N + 1||j||Ij)λ̂j}j∈[ρ].
6. Finally, SKL,ID = {E, {SKk,Lk,ID}k∈[N ], SKID}.
– PHR File Storage: During this part, the PHR owner encrypts his private
PHR file F and uploads the resulted ciphertexts to the cloud storage server
managed by the PHR service provider. Whenever the PHR owner intends
to create and upload a file F to the cloud servers, he first defines an access
policy for the file, which is represented by W = [W1,W2, · · · ,WN ] ∧ ∗,
where Wk = {Wk,i}1≤i≤nk for k ∈ [N ]. Each Wk,i is chosen from the value
set Sk,i∪{∗} of the attribute ωk,i. For instance, Wk,i could be an attribute
like “profession=physician” while the attribute “profession” has multiple
values. Note that, the PHR owner just sets Wk,i = ∗ to indicate that the
owner does not care the attribute ωk,i in the access policy. Subsequently,
the PHR owner randomly picks a symmetric key K from the key space and
encrypts the file F based on K using a standard symmetric key encryp-
tion algorithm such as AES to generate a ciphertext CF . Then, he runs
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the following attribute-based encryption algorithm Encrypt on (M,W ) and
obtains the ciphertext CM , CTW of the symmetric key K with respect to
the access policy W , where M = TH(K). It is noted that TH is a trapdoor
hash function with a trapdoor TD such that M ∈ GT . Finally, the PHR
owner uploads (CF , TD,CM ) to the cloud storage server.
Encrypt: The attribute-based encryption algorithm proceeds as follows:
To encrypt M ∈R GT under the access policy W = [W1,W2, · · · ,WN ], the
PHR owner chooses s ∈R Z∗p, and computes C0 = MY s and Ĉ = gs2. Then
the following steps are performed.
1. For each 1 ≤ k ≤ N , the PHR owner parses Wk = {Wk,i}1≤i≤nk and
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nk, the following two circumstances are considered:
– Case 1: If vk,i,t ∈ Wk,i, the PHR owner chooses sk,i,t ∈R Z∗p and
computes{
Ck,i,t,0, Ck,i,t,1, Ĉk,i,t,0, Ĉk,i,t,1
}
=
{
H(0||k||i||vk,i,t)sk,i,t , gsk,i,t2 , H(1||k||i||vk,i,t)s−sk,i,t , g
s−sk,i,t
1
}
.
– Case 2: If vk,i,t /∈Wk,i, the PHR owner chooses sk,i,t, s′k,i,t ∈R Z∗p
and computes{
Ck,i,t,0, Ck,i,t,1, Ĉk,i,t,0, Ĉk,i,t,1
}
=
{
H(0||k||i||vk,i,t)sk,i,t , gsk,i,t2 , H(1||k||i||vk,i,t)s
′
k,i,t , g
s′k,i,t
1
}
.
2. For k = N + 1, the PHR owner chooses sj , s
′
j ∈R Z∗p, then for each
1 ≤ j ≤ ρ, computes
{C0,j,0, C0,j,1, Ĉ0,j,0, Ĉ0,j,1} = {H(0||N+1||j||0)s
′
j , g
s′j
2 , H(1||N+1||j||0)s−s
′
j , g
s−s′j
1 },
and
{C1,j,0, C1,j,1, Ĉ1,j,0, Ĉ1,j,1} = {H(0||N+1||j||1)sj , gsj2 , H(1||N+1||j||1)s−sj , g
s−sj
1 }.
Finally, the attribute-based ciphertext is
CTW =
{
C0, Ĉ, {Ck,i,t,0, Ck,i,t,1, Ĉk,i,t,0, Ĉk,i,t,1}k∈[N ],i∈[nk],t∈[mk,i] ,
{Ci,j,0, Ci,j,1, Ĉi,j,0, Ĉi,j,1}i∈{0,1},j∈[ρ]
}
.
– PHR File Access: When a PHR user wants to access the PHR file F , he
sends the request message to the PHR service provider. The PHR service
provider sends back the ciphertext (CF , TD,CM ) to the user. If the PHR
user has the privilege to access the PHR file F , he can decrypt to get the
trapdoor hash value M = TH(K) of the symmetric key K through the
following attribute-based decryption algorithm Decrypt on CTW = CM .
Then, the user computes the symmetric key K based on M and the trap-
door TD. Finally, the PHR file can be obtained by performing the sym-
metric decryption algorithm based on CF and K.
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Decrypt: Suppose a user with SKL,ID = {E, {SKk,Lk,ID}k∈[N ], SKID}
for an attribute list L = {Lk}k∈[N ] and GID = (I1, I2, · · · , Iρ) ∈R {0, 1}ρ
wants to decrypt the ciphertext CTW , where Lk = {Lk,1, Lk,2, · · · , Lk,nk} =
{vk,1,tk,1 , vk,2,tk,2 , · · · , vk,nk,tk,nk }. Then
1. To decrypt the ciphertext without knowing the ciphertext policy W ,
the PHR user computes C1 and C2 in the following:
– Suppose the indexes satisfy Lk,i = vk,i,t, C1 is computed as
C1 =
∏N
k=1
∏nk
i=1 eˆ(Ck,i,t,0, Dk,i,0)eˆ(Ĉk,i,t,0, D̂k,i,0)∏N
k=1
∏nk
i=1 eˆ(Ck,i,t,1, Dk,i,1)eˆ(Ĉk,i,t,1, D̂k,i,1)
. (1)
– C2 is computed by taking the following two cases into account:
C2 =
∏ρ
i=1 eˆ(CIj ,j,0, Dj,0)eˆ(ĈIj ,j,0, D̂j,0)∏ρ
i=1 eˆ(CIj ,j,1, Dj,1)eˆ(ĈIj ,j,1, D̂j,1)
. (2)
2. Finally, the PHR user can achieved M = C0(C1C2eˆ(E, Ĉ))
−1.
– Black-Box Tracing: Suppose an illegal device is found to be used to
access the PHR files stored in the could storage servers. In order to pinpoint
the identity of the dishonest user, the TPA can adopt the following tracing
algorithm Trace.
Trace: Suppose the ciphertext policy is W . the TPA does:
1. Extracts L0 = {Lkj ,ij,t}1≤j≤τ,1≤t≤tj from W , where 1 ≤ kj ≤ N ,
1 ≤ tj ≤ nkj , 1 ≤ ij,t ≤ nkj for 1 ≤ j ≤ τ , 1 ≤ t ≤ tj . The values in
positions except those in Index0 = {{(kj , ij,t)}1≤j≤τ,1≤t≤tj} are ∗.
2. For a suspicious user set S, in which the users have the attributes
associated with L0, there are two ways to pinpoint the identity from S.
Case 1: The size of set S is not huge. In this case, the TPA just encrypts
some message with respect to W for each GID ∈ S until the identity
is determined. To encrypt a message M ∈ GT under the access policy
W = [W1,W2, · · · ,WN ] ∧WN+1, where WN+1 = GID, the TPA first
chooses s ∈R Z∗p, computes C0 = MY s, and then does the following:
(a) For each 1 ≤ k ≤ N , parse Wk = {Wk,i}1≤i≤nk . For 1 ≤ i ≤ nk,
it does: If vk,i,t ∈Wk,i, choose sk,i,t ∈R Z∗p and compute the compo-
nents {Ck,i,t,0, Ck,i,t,1, Ĉk,i,t,0, Ĉk,i,t,1} as {H(0||k||i||vk,i,t)sk,i,t , gsk,i,t2 ,
H(1||k||i||vk,i,t)s−sk,i,t , gs−sk,i,t1 }. If vk,i,t /∈Wk,i, choose sk,i,t, s′k,i,t ∈R
Z∗p and compute the components as {H(0||k||i||vk,i,t)sk,i,t , gsk,i,t2 ,
H(1||k||i||vk,i,t)s′k,i,t , gs
′
k,i,t
1 }.
(b) For k = N + 1, assume GID = {I1, I2, · · · , Iρ}, choose sj , s′j , s′′j ∈R
Z∗p, then for each 1 ≤ j ≤ ρ, the following two circumstances
are considered: If Ij = 0, compute {C0,j,0, C0,j,1, Ĉ0,j,0, Ĉ0,j,1} =
{H(0||N+1||j||0)sj , gsj2 , H(1||N+1||j||0)s−sj , gs−sj1 } and {C1,j,0, C1,j,1,
Ĉ1,j,0, Ĉ1,j,1} = {H(0||N + 1||j||1)s′j , gs
′
j
2 , H(1||N + 1||j||1)s
′′
j , g
s′′j
1 }.
If Ij = 1, compute {C0,j,0, C0,j,1, Ĉ0,j,0, Ĉ0,j,1} = {H(0||N+1||j||0)s′j ,
g
s′j
2 , H(1||N + 1||j||0)s
′′
j , g
s′′j
1 }, and {C1,j,0, C1,j,1, Ĉ1,j,0, Ĉ1,j,1} =
{H(0||N + 1||j||1)sj , gsj2 , H(1||N + 1||j||1)s−sj , gs−sj1 }.
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It can be easily seen that a PHR user is able to decrypt the ciphertext
only when his global identity is GID and he has the attribute list L0.
Case 2: The size of set S is huge, and the tracing algorithm proceeds:
(a) First, the TPA tries an attribute value Lk,i from the position (k, i)
where Wk,i = ∗. Then, it encrypts a message using the normal
encryption algorithm with respect to W ′ such that all positions
are set to be ∗, except the positions defined by Index0 ∪ (k, i) are
set to be L′0 = L0 ∪ Lk,i.
(b) The ciphertext is sent to the private device. If the ciphertext can
be decrypted correctly, the TPA knows one of the users with L′0
shares his attribute private key. The suspicious user set is of course
not greater than |S|. the TPA continues the above procedure until
the suspicious set |S| is not too huge. Finally, the technique for
small |S| can be applied and the identity in the private device can
be pinpointed.
5 Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
5.1 Security Analysis
We follow the selective ciphertext-policy and chosen-plaintext (sCP-IND-CPA)
attack models [24] used in most of the existing work on ABE in the literature.
The goal of an adversary is to extract either the information on the message
or that of the ciphertext policy.
Theorem 1 Under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman, Decision Linear,
and q-Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumptions, the proposed scheme
is sCP-IND-CPA secure and achieves user accountability.
Proof The basic encryption algorithm in our scheme is the same with the one
in [19]. We adopt the technique in [24] to extend it for multiple attribute
authorities. The detail proof follows from that in [19,24].
5.2 Performance Analysis
We only consider the time-consuming operations pairing and exponentiation.
Let Pair be a bilinear pairing operation, Exp an exponentiation in G, ExpT
an exponentiation in GT . We denote by n the total number of attribute values,
nk the number of attributes managed by AAk, and ρ the bit length of the PHR
user’s global identity. The corresponding computation cost is (4n + 4)Exp +
ExpT for PHR owners and (
∑
k∈[N ] 4nk + 4ρ+ 1)Pair+3Exp for PHR users.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a multi-authority CP-ABE scheme with user ac-
countability and apply it to design an attribute-based PHR sharing system.
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In the proposed solution, the access policy is hidden and hence user access
privacy is protected. In particular, user accountability is achived, and thus the
trust assumptions on both the authorities and the PHR users are reduced.
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